

**Scottish Police Authority
Armed Policing: Call for
Evidence**

**Analysis of written
responses**

**SCOTTISH POLICE AUTHORITY ARMED
POLICING: CALL FOR EVIDENCE**

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Police Scotland has allowed its complement of approximately 275 Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) police officers to deploy to routine incidents across Scotland with visible firearms¹. This policy has generated much public debate which has led to the Scottish Police Authority (SPA) and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) collaborating in undertaking a programme of policy review and inquiry. HMICS reported on their assurance review of Police Scotland's Standing Firearms Authority on 27 October 2014².

1.2 The SPA launched a call for evidence on armed policing on 22 September 2014 with views invited from a wide range of stakeholders. Public evidence sessions were also held in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Inverness.

1.3 The call for evidence closed officially on 17 October and attracted responses from 194 individuals and organisations. Around three-quarters (77%) of responses were from members of the public.

1.4 A summary of views contained in the written responses to the call for evidence follows.

Community Impact

1.5 82% of those who provided a view perceived Police Scotland's decision to allow its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms as having impacted negatively on their or the public's feelings of safety and security. The main reasons provided to support this perception were that visible firearms create the impression of increased danger; the policy increases the risk of fatal accidents; and armed police at routine incidents increases the risk of a situation escalating into violence, when it may otherwise have been resolved peacefully.

1.6 72% of those who provided a view perceived the policy of visibly armed police attending routine incidents to have increased their or the public's fear of crime. The reason most often cited for this perception was that armed police at such incidents create the impression that serious crime, including terrorism, is rife

1.7 83% of those who provided a view perceived the policy of visibly armed police attending routine incidents to have reduced their or the public's levels of satisfaction with Police Scotland. Many respondents considered the policy to

¹ This policy changed on 1 October 2014 to one of deploying specialist ARV officers only to incidents involving firearms, or those where there is a threat to life.

² <http://www.hmics.org/sites/default/files/publications/HMICS%20-%20Review%20of%20Standing%20Firearms%20Authority%20for%20Armed%20Response%20Vehicle%20Crews%20within%20Police%20Scotland.pdf>

have been introduced in a high-handed manner, without consultation. It was seen as a “one size fits all” solution rather than tailored to local circumstances and context.

1.8 77% of those who provided a view felt that the policy had reduced their or the public’s levels of confidence and trust in Police Scotland, although many commented that their levels of confidence and trust in their local police service remained constant. The most common reason given for diminished confidence and trust was that the policy decision had been made without public consultation, and appeared to be against public opinion.

1.9 63% of those who addressed the issue considered the policy decision on armed policing to have human rights or civil liberties implications. Many also felt that the power relationship between the police and public had been changed by the policy with members of the public feeling threatened and intimidated by police officers who are visibly armed.

1.10 A slight majority of those who commented (54%) did not consider the policy decision to have any equality implications. A repeated comment was that the same equality issues exist whether or not police are armed.

Consultation and engagement

1.11 An overarching picture to emerge was one of lack of engagement of Police Scotland with stakeholders including members of the public in relation to the policy of ARV police officers deployed to routine incidents with visible firearms. Very few respondents reported receiving any information from Police Scotland about the policy.

1.12 Members of the public reported hearing about the policy largely via media such as their local press and Radio Scotland.

1.13 Although the vast majority of those who addressed the issue assessed the level of consultation that has taken place on the policy as non-existent or very poor, not all of them expected consultation to take place. Whilst most were surprised that what they perceived to be a major policy change in policing could be brought about without prior widescale consultation, a small minority were of the view that there was no need for this due to the operational nature of the decision.

1.14 90% of those who provided a view on the issue felt that Police Scotland should have engaged with the public about deploying trained ARV police officers to routine incidents. Many considered that engagement was appropriate as the policy change was of significance with implications going beyond operational issues.

1.15 A recurring view was that the best way for Police Scotland to address public concerns and provide reassurance was to reverse the policy and consult or engage with the public in future before any significant policy affecting the public is implemented. Another common theme was that public concerns could be addressed by Police Scotland being open and transparent about the reasons for implementing the policy.

1.16 In considering what lessons can be learned from the implementation of Police Scotland’s firearms deployment policy, the most common response was that Police Scotland should learn to consult with relevant stakeholders prior to implementing major policy change. Other key lessons identified included: providing information in a timely fashion to the public; being more discerning over classifying a decision as solely operational when it has wider implications; maintaining closer links with local communities; and ensuring that major policy changes are subject to greater scrutiny.

GENERAL VIEWS ON ARMED POLICING

1.17 On a scale of one to five, with one representing being very reassured and five representing being not at all reassured, ratings were given by respondents for the following options:

Options	Average rating
ARV police officers carrying <u>visible</u> firearms and attending routine incidents	4.6
ARV police officers carrying firearms <u>covertly</u> and attending routine incidents	4.0
ARV officers carrying visible firearms but <u>only</u> being deployed to incidents where firearms are necessary	2.1

1.18 These options were criticised for not including a further option of ARV police officers attending routine incidents but locking their firearms in their vehicles ready for prompt access to them if required.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1.19 A common view was that since the establishment of the single force, lines of accountability and scrutiny are not entirely clear. Calls were made repeatedly for the scrutiny role of the SPA and local authorities to be clarified.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Police Scotland has allowed its complement of approximately 275 Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) police officers to deploy to routine incidents across Scotland with visible firearms. Routine incidents are those which do not require firearms and where trained ARV police officers are supporting local police officers or tackling local priorities in their day to day work.

2.2 The policy has generated much public debate, which has led to the SPA and HMICS collaborating in undertaking a programme of policy review and inquiry.

2.3 The SPA launched a call for evidence on armed policing on 22 September 2014, and invited a wide range of interested parties, including members of the public, to submit their views and provide evidence. The views received will inform the SPA's wider scrutiny inquiry on armed policing.

2.4 HMICS also conducted an assurance review, independently from SPA's call for evidence. The aim of their review was to assess the current practices by Police Scotland in relation to the Standing Authority for the Issue and Carriage of Firearms in terms of the compliance with the relevant guidance, procedures and recognised best practice. This review reported on 27 October 2014.

2.5 The written response from the public and interested groups have informed a series of public evidence sessions in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Inverness, to allow SPA members to hear directly from interested parties and the public about their views and concerns. A survey of views was also conducted by TNS UK to seek views on aspects of the policy of allowing trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms.

2.6 The SPA inquiry will draw together both its own findings from its call for evidence, public meetings and survey, and those of the HMICS assurance review, and produce an overarching report with recommendations.

2.7 This report presents the findings from the analysis of the responses to the SPA's written call for evidence. The exercise was launched on 22 September and closed officially on 17 October 2014 although late responses were accepted up until early November. The launch of the call for evidence was accompanied by a news release and was publicised further by the BBC and Radio Scotland and on the SPA website. 350 interested organisations were contacted directly by the SPA to invite their evidence. The response form was published electronically with opportunity to respond online or to print the form in hard copy and email or post it to SPA.

2.8 A significant occurrence during the period of the call for evidence was that the Police Scotland policy at the focus of the consultation, was changed on 1

October 2014, to one of deploying specialist ARV officers only to incidents involving firearms, or those where there is a threat to life.

Consultation responses

2.9 The SPA received 194 responses to the consultation. Table 2.1 below shows the distribution of responses by category of respondent. A full list of respondents is in Annex 1.

Table 2.1: Distribution of responses by category of respondent

Category of respondent	No. of respondents	% of respondents
Member of the public	149	77
Local authority bodies	15	8
Elected representative	9	5
Community Councils	6	3
Police bodies	2	1
Community Justice Authorities	2	1
Community Safety Partnerships	2	1
MSPs	2	1
Other	7	4
Total	194	100

NB Percentages may not add to 100% exactly due to rounding.

2.10 Just over three-quarters (77%) of responses were submitted by members of the public. Fifteen local authority bodies provided a response, and comprised the largest organisation sector to respond accounting for 8% of all responses. Most respondents used the response pro-forma provided, although a significant minority submitted their views in free-text format. The views contained in all submissions were amalgamated into one electronic spreadsheet to aid analysis.

2.11 The call for evidence comprised a questionnaire containing 19 main questions, all but three allowing for qualitative, free text response, the remaining three in the form of an opinion scale. The final question invited any additional comments over and above those already documented.

2.12 Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they wished their response to be made public. 114 respondents were content for their response to be made public; 33 respondents indicated that they did not wish their response to be publicised; 47 respondents did not provide any indication one way or another and have therefore been assumed to be confidential. Whilst the general views of those who do not wish their views to be made public, or did not provide any indication of whether they wished this, have been taken into account in the following analysis, these responses have not been quoted from in the report.

Report of findings

2.13 The findings are presented in the following four chapters. **Chapter 3** reports views on the community impact of Police Scotland's decision to allow trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms. In **Chapter 4**, respondents' perceptions and experiences of the consultation and engagement conducted by Police Scotland regarding their decision are documented and respondents' views on lessons learned from the implementation of the policy are summarised. **Chapter 5** analyses responses to the opinion scales relating to general views on armed policing. Other significant comments over and above those raised specifically on the questions posed in the consultation are summarised in **Chapter 6**.

2.14 Respondent categories have been abbreviated in the report as follows:

Members of the public	Pub
Local Authority bodies	LA
Elected representatives	ER
Community Councils	CC
Police bodies	Pol
Community Justice Authorities	CJA
Community Safety Partnerships	CSP
MSPs	MSP
Other organisations	Oth

3. COMMUNITY IMPACT

Question 1: Has Police Scotland’s decision to allow its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms impacted on your and/or the public’s feelings of safety and security? If so, how?

3.1 159 respondents (82% of all those who responded to the call for evidence) addressed this question. Table 3.1 shows the balance of views amongst them.

Table 3.1: Views on impact of decision on feelings of safety and security

View on impact	No. of respondents	% of respondents
Less safe	131	82
More safe	9	6
No impact	10	6
Don’t know	2	1
Commentary but no clear answer	7	4
Total	159	100

NB Percentages may not add to 100% exactly due to rounding.

3.2 82% of those who addressed this question perceived the decision to have impacted negatively on their own or the public’s feelings of safety and security. A minority of 6% of respondents reported feeling safer under the new regime. All of them were members of the public.

Reasons given for feeling less safe and secure

3.3 The following reasons were given for feeling less safe and secure:

- Creates the impression of increased danger/suggests armed criminals are more prevalent. (36 mentions)
- Greater risk of a fatal accident involving a member of the public or a suspect. (32 mentions)
- Greater risk of a situation which previously could have been resolved peacefully, escalating into violence. (30 mentions)
- Police officers appear intimidating and people will be less likely to approach them. (20 mentions)
- Will lead to criminals becoming routinely armed. (18 mentions)
- Firearms could fall into the wrong hands. (6 mentions)
- Makes police officers more vulnerable to attack as criminals will try to steal their firearms. (2 mentions)

Reasons given for feeling safer and more secure

3.4 Amongst the members of the public who considered that the decision made them feel safer and more secure, the most common reason given was that they felt more confident that the police were properly equipped to deal with any

incident that could arrive. A few perceived the public to be safer as police firearms would never be too far away (seen to be particularly beneficial to those living in rural areas).

Other views

3.5 Amongst the few who felt the decision made no impact emerged the view that people are accustomed to seeing armed officers at airports and abroad so it should make no difference seeing them on the streets of Scotland.

Question 2: Has Police Scotland’s decision to allow its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms impacted on your and/or the public’s fear of crime? If so, how?

3.6 138 respondents (71% of all those who responded to the call for evidence) addressed this question. Table 3.2 shows the balance of views amongst them.

Table 3.2: Views on impact of decision on fear crime

View on impact	No. of respondents	% of respondents
More fearful	100	72
Less fearful	5	4
No impact	28	20
Don’t know	4	3
Commentary but no clear answer	1	1
Total	138	100

3.7 72% of those who addressed this question perceived the decision to have made them and/or the public more fearful of crime. One in five of those addressing the question reported the decision having no impact on fear of crime. Five respondents considered that they and/or the public were less in fear of crime due to the decision to deploy ARV police officers to routine incidents.

Reasons given for increased fear of crime

3.8 The reasons given for feeling more fearful of crime overlapped with those previously provided in relation to perceptions of safety. The following reasons were identified:

- Creates the impression that crime including terrorism is rife. (29 mentions) For example, “The visible firearms policy has increased the public's fear of crime by implicating that our society is more dangerous than before. The very fact that Police Officers feel it is necessary to wear firearms on routine duties sounds an alarming message, which has undone the huge amount of work that has been done by the police in recent years in an effort to reduce the public’s perceived fear of crime” (Pub).
- Makes it more likely that criminals and members of the public will arm themselves. (28 mentions)

- More likely to be escalations of violence rather than peaceful resolutions. (16 mentions)
- Accidents could occur. (10 mentions)
- Firearms could be stolen and misused. (4 mentions)

3.9 11 respondents commented that their fear of crime had not changed, but their fear of armed police officers had increased.

Reasons given for reduced fear of crime

3.10 Five members of the public stated that their fear of crime had reduced as a result of the decision. They felt that this policy would focus the mind of the criminal into realising that they could face serious injury or death if they threaten the police or the public.

Other views

3.11 One respondent reported being unaffected by the decision as they were well acquainted with the crime statistics and understood the trend to be downward.

Question 3: Has Police Scotland’s decision to allow its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms impacted on your and/or the public’s levels of satisfaction? If so, how?

3.12 132 respondents (68% of all those who responded to the call for evidence) addressed this question. Table 3.3 shows the balance of views amongst them.

Table 3.3: Views on impact of decision on levels of satisfaction

View on impact	No. of respondents	% of respondents
Reduced satisfaction	109	83
Increased satisfaction	2	2
No impact	17	13
Don’t know	3	2
Commentary but no clear answer	1	1
Total	132	100

NB Percentages may not add to 100% exactly due to rounding.

3.13 83% of those who addressed this question perceived the decision to have made them and/or the public less satisfied with Police Scotland. Only two respondents reported an increase in satisfaction with 17 considering that the decision had made no impact on their and/or the public’s level of satisfaction.

3.14 An examination of the reasons provided by respondents to support their views shows that rather than the policy itself reducing levels of satisfaction, the main reason for this negative impact was the way in which the policy was seen to

have been introduced. Respondents from a range of different sectors perceived its implementation to have been high-handed and imposed without consultation. There was criticism of the Chief Constable for imposing the policy upon the public rather than in agreement with them, and subsequently appearing to react inappropriately to public concerns. One respondent remarked:

“It has been a long standing public policy that police officers in Scotland are not routinely issued with lethal weapons or seen carrying them in the streets. The decision to reverse this policy should therefore have been the subject of public consultation and debate beforehand. The high-handedness involved in ignoring public opinion and legitimate concerns does not make for good relations with the public whom the Police are there to serve” (Inclusion Scotland).

3.15 15 respondents who felt their satisfaction with Police Scotland had reduced as a result of the decision argued that the policy appears to ignore local contexts and tries to fit one size to all.

3.16 Another recurring criticism (12 mentions) was that the decision does not reflect what people in Scotland want, and does not represent policing by consent. A member of the public commented:

“Police Scotland should be there to serve the public, not be a law unto itself” (Pub).

3.17 11 respondents argued that the decision creates a divide between the police and local communities which is detrimental to levels of satisfaction.

3.18 The remaining reasons provided by respondents to account for their perception of lowered levels of satisfaction were:

- contributes to a police state (4 mentions)
- raises fears (3 mentions)
- makes the police look ridiculous and incapable of carrying out their duties without firearms (3 mentions).

3.19 The two members of the public who reported increased levels of satisfaction both felt that arming police would result in them better able to protect themselves and the public.

Question 4: Has Police Scotland’s decision to allow its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms impacted on your and/or the public’s levels of confidence and trust in Police Scotland? If so, how?

3.20 141 respondents (73% of all those who responded to the call for evidence) addressed this question. Table 3.4 overleaf shows the balance of views amongst them.

Table 3.4: Views on impact of decision on levels of confidence and trust

View on impact	No. of respondents	% of respondents
Reduced levels	109	77
Increased levels	3	2
No impact	16	11
Don't know	5	4
Commentary but no clear answer	8	6
Total	141	100

3.21 77% of those who addressed this question perceived the decision to have reduced their levels of confidence and trust in Police Scotland. Only three respondents (all members of the public) felt that their levels of confidence and trust had increased. 16 respondents did not consider that the decision had impacted on their levels of confidence and trust in Police Scotland. Amongst those who did not know whether confidence and trust had been affected were police and community safety organisations which stated that measurement of impact had not been undertaken or was difficult to gauge.

3.23 Many respondents commented that although their confidence and trust in Police Scotland had diminished, their levels of confidence and trust in their local service remained constant.

3.24 The most common reason given for confidence and trust levels reducing was that the **decision had been made without public consultation**, in what was perceived to be a “top down” manner, and going against the wishes of the public. A few respondents referred to a “we know best” attitude which appeared to fly in the face of policing by consent. A common view was that as this decision had been taken without apparent consultation, other major decisions may follow in this manner. Some respondents remarked that if the reasoning behind the decision is made more public, then this might help to boost public confidence. Comments included:

“It suggests that the police believe that they are entitled to make such a fundamental change in their relationship with the public without even informing them, never mind seeking consent. This strikes at the core of trust between the public and the police” (Ind).

“A decision about routine deployment of armed police should never have been allowed to be a purely operational decision. It raises doubts as to whether other matters that should have been publicly discussed (issues of confidentiality and of access to electronic communications) are being adequately monitored” (City of Brechin and District Community Council).

3.25 Another common rationale for reduced levels of confidence and trust was that armed police officers **appear intimidating and dangerous to approach**,

which breaks the previous mutual trust between the local police and the community and makes members of the public less likely to approach them.

Comments from members of the public included:

“When I have been to other countries where the police routinely carry weapons openly, it is a very unpleasant feeling and it immediately puts a barrier between you as a citizen and the officer who is supposed to be protecting you. I do not feel at all protected by a person with a gun.”

“I do not trust anyone who is wearing a firearm, I am intimidated by it so would have no confidence or trust in such an officer.”

“Damaged my trust in the police. I now view them as a threat who are not there to serve the public.”

3.26 Less commonly stated reasons for a reduction in confidence and trust were:

- The decision shows that Police Scotland is out of touch with local communities and their needs as this approach is not proportionate and not appropriate in many areas. (11 mentions)
- The decision makes fatal accidents more likely to happen. (8 mentions)
- The grounds for bringing in the policy on armed policing are dubious and suggest a lack of judgement by Police Scotland’s leadership. (5 mentions)

3.27 The reason given by three members of the public for their levels of confidence and trust in Police Scotland increasing as a result of this decision, was that they now felt reassured that the police were better equipped to deal with situations which may arise, thus protecting their own and the public’s safety more effectively. One commented:

“It has improved my level of confidence as I know that it makes for safer deployment of armed officers.”

Question 5: Does Police Scotland’s decision to allow its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms have any human rights or civil liberties implications for you and/or the public? If so, what are these implications?

3.28 123 respondents (63% of all those who responded to the call for evidence) addressed this question. Table 3.5 overleaf shows the balance of views amongst them.

Table 3.5: Views on whether the decision has human rights or civil liberties implications

View on impact	No. of respondents	% of respondents
Yes	77	63
No	33	27
Not sure	5	4
Relevant comments only	8	7
Total	123	100

NB Percentages may not add to 100% exactly due to rounding.

3.29 63% of those who addressed this question perceived the decision to have human rights or civil liberties implications. However, a sizeable minority of over a quarter of those who addressed the issue (27%) did not consider this to be the case. Amongst those who did not consider the decision to have human rights or civil liberties implications were 24 members of the public and both police bodies.

Views of those who considered there to be human rights or civil liberties implications

3.30 The most common reason given for stating that the decision has human rights or civil liberties implications was that there is now **more chance of an innocent person (member of the public or suspected criminal) being shot**. Respondents considered that they may be less likely to intervene positively in threatening incidents with the knowledge that their actions may be misinterpreted by an armed police officer. They also expressed concerns about mistaken identity and felt that they could not go about their daily lives as freely as they had previously on account of the decision.

3.31 Another prominent rationale was that a police officer, visibly armed, introduces a **different power relationship** with the public than had previously existed, with members of the public potentially feeling threatened, intimidated and not equal due to the implicit threat of force. One elected representative commented that women may feel this imbalance in the power relationship even more than men. One comment was:

“As an ordinary citizen I am uncomfortable when dealing with an armed officer: I perceive them as paramilitary and not approachable as ‘equals’ in the way that unarmed officers are. This is a significant change in relationship between citizen and police” (Pub).

3.32 17 respondents considered that the **process of implementing the decision** to allow police officers with visible firearms to attend routine incidents had infringed their civil liberties in that they regarded this to be unaccountable and against the principle of policing by consent.

3.33 Eight respondents (four members of the public and four local authorities) remarked that the decision was **out of step with Articles 2 and 3 of the**

European Convention of Human Rights relating to procedural safeguards and right to life. For example:

“Under Article 2 of the ECHR (Right to life) states that everyone’s right to life must be protected by law. There are only very limited circumstances where it is acceptable for the state to use force against a person that results in their death, in these circumstances any force must be strictly proportionate to the situation.

The Right to Life is therefore a fundamental principle within our society. Nobody has the right or authority to take life. The Police have the right to protect life but not beyond. The decision to routinely arm police calls this fundamental principle into question” (Highland Council).

3.34 The implications documented by fewer than eight respondents were:

- Reduces freedom to protest peacefully. (6 mentions)
“The possibility of armed police on the streets may make entirely peaceful individuals fearful of attending lawful demonstrations thus restricting public debate and civil liberties” (Stockbridge and Inverleith Community Council).
- Reduces expectations that the police will protect the public. (4 mentions)
- Reduces the freedom to challenge or query police behaviour. (3 mentions)
- Increases fear that the police may overreact and act disproportionately to any situation. (3 mentions)

Views of those who considered there to be no human rights or civil liberties implications

3.35 The most common view amongst those who did not perceive the decision to have implications for human rights or civil liberties was that this was an operational decision, taken to increase the safety of members of the public, with no change to any policy on when firearms should be discharged. Three members of the public reported feeling more protected in the knowledge that police officers are properly equipped to deal with incidents.

3.36 One police body remarked that many police forces across Europe routinely arm and carry their firearms overtly, whilst still protecting the human rights of the public.

Question 6: Does Police Scotland’s decision to allow its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms have any equality implications for you and/or the public? If so, what are these implications?

3.37 99 respondents (51% of all those who responded to the call for evidence) addressed this question. Table 3.6 shows the balance of views amongst them.

Table 3.6: Views on whether the decision has equality implications

View on impact	No. of respondents	% of respondents
Yes	34	34
No	53	54
Too early to say	1	1
Not sure what question means	5	5
Relevant comments only	6	6
Total	99	100

3.38 A slight majority of those who responded (54%) did not perceive the decision to have any equality implications. A repeated comment was that the same equality issues exist whether or not police are armed. A few respondents appeared to view the question as having been posed simply to make the call for evidence “politically correct”. Indeed, five respondents commented that they could not understand why the question had been posed at all.

3.39 Amongst those who considered that there may be equality implications, 12 repeated the prominent view which emerged in relation to human rights, stating that arming police resulted in changing the power relationship between the public and the police, making this unequal. One local authority explained this thus:

“The issue should be considered in terms of a balance of power between citizen and police officer. Arming police officers confers overt mechanical superiority” (Dumfries and Galloway Council).

3.40 Several respondents specified sectors of the population whom they considered may be impacted upon more than others as a result of the decision. A recurring theme was that evidence from stop and search procedures suggested that the following groups may attract greater attention from armed police than other members of the public:

- minority ethnic communities
- young people (particularly young men)
- people living in deprived areas.

3.41 Other sectors identified by respondents as those for whom there may be equality implications arising from the decision were:

- People who may misunderstand police warnings or present themselves in a manner which could be misinterpreted by an armed police officer (e.g. people with learning disabilities; hard of hearing; mentally ill; do not speak English). One respondent remarked:
“Amongst disabled people there are several impairment groups whose condition may be misinterpreted by the Police as a failure to respond to warnings, drunkenness or threatening – for example those with learning disabilities, impaired hearing/deaf, autism or epilepsy have in the past been pepper sprayed, tasered or aggressively restrained by the Police. Additionally the actions of people with mental health issues are regularly

misinterpreted as threatening when in fact they are simply not conforming to ordinary members of the public or police's expectations" (Inclusion Scotland).

- Elderly/vulnerable/people on autistic spectrum for whom the impact of the decision is to make them feel very concerned and worried.
- Rural communities for whom the decision represents a disproportionate response in view of their low crime rates.

Question 7: Any other comments on community impact?

3.42 Many respondents repeated comments previously made in response to other questions. The key substantive points made over and above these were:

- Blanket policies made by a single force do not reflect local circumstances and relationships between the public and the police, and can be damaging for close and trusting relationships on the ground. For example, one respondent remarked:
"Inner city/Met situation should not be mimicked in Scottish towns and villages, where firearms are quite frankly just not required or welcome" (Pub).
- The decision is at odds with what people understand from official statistics about crime rates decreasing, and results in anxiety within communities about the police's ability to deal with even lower levels of crime unarmed.

3.43 One member of the public expressed their disappointment that the decision has drawn attention away from the excellent standard of policing which they considered most communities to enjoy. A small number of respondents, including one police body and members of the public suggested that the views of many supporters of the decision had not been given prominence in the media in the way those of critics had been aired. One suggested that unarmed policing in communities where firearms would be operationally sensible would have more of a community impact in terms of reduced safety and higher levels of crime resulting.

4. CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT

Question 8: Has Police Scotland engaged with you in any manner about its policy of allowing its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms? If yes, what was the nature of this engagement and when did it occur? Did you initiate any of this engagement with Police Scotland?

4.1 148 respondents (76% of all those who responded to the call for evidence) addressed this question. A clear picture emerged of a lack of engagement with respondents by Police Scotland prior to implementation of the policy. Many members of the public explained how they had heard about the policy via media such as their local press and Radio Scotland. A few respondents commented that they did not expect to be engaged by Police Scotland over the policy as it represented no change for their area (LA), was an operational decision (Pol) and had been hugely publicised anyway (two members of the public).

4.2 On the very few occasions where engagement was reported by respondents, this tended to be in response to proactivity by the respondent themselves to seek information and clarification on the policy. The response by Police Scotland on these occasions was deemed overall to be very helpful. For example, police representatives had attended local council meetings to answer questions, with police officers reported in one area to have been made available to respond directly to public queries. Some respondents reported communicating by letter with Police Scotland over the policy.

Question 9: Have you received any information from Police Scotland about its policy of allowing the complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms? If yes, what information was provided and when? Did you actively request this information from Police Scotland?

4.3 143 respondents (74% of all those who responded to the call for evidence) addressed this question. Of these only 11 (8%) reported receiving any information from Police Scotland about the policy.

4.4 Some information was imparted at Community Safety Committee meetings with representatives of the police in attendance to answer questions and provide verbal updates. Responses to email and written requests for information from local authorities, MSPs and members of the public appeared to have been answered satisfactorily in the main. COSLA reported receiving the “FAQs” which were released and published online following the media coverage in relation to armed policing in late summer 2014. One local authority described an email received on 3rd October 2014 from the Superintendent of their Police Division, informing them of a press release.

Question 10: How would you assess the level of consultation that has taken place on Police Scotland’s policy of allowing its complement of trained ARV police officers to deploy to routine incidents with visible firearms? Please outline the reason(s) for your answer, if possible.

4.5 145 respondents addressed this question (75% of all those responding to the consultation). 133 respondents assessed the level of consultation as non-existent or very poor, however not all of them expected consultation on the policy to take place. In addition, a few respondents did not provide an assessment of the level of consultation, but instead provided their view that it was entirely appropriate for Police Scotland not to consult on this issue. One member of the public considered the level of consultation to be effective as they had seen information about the policy in their local press.

Reasons given where the level of consultation was assessed as poor

4.6 Many respondents expressed surprise that what they perceived to be a major policy change in policing could be brought about without consultation at least with Parliament and/or relevant stakeholders such as justice organisations. A community justice authority described their disappointment at not being deployed as a consultative resource in this context; an MSP and member of the Justice Sub-Committee held a similar view:

“As a member of the Justice Sub-Committee on Policing, a body established to oversee the operation of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, I believe the public would be surprised and perturbed that neither the committee nor Parliament was formally informed of this change by Police Scotland until approximately 13 months after it was introduced” (Alison McInnes, Member for North East Scotland Region & Scottish Liberal Democrat Justice Spokesperson).

4.7 Many felt that the decision could not be accepted as only an operational matter, but instead represented a fundamental departure from accepted approaches to policing in Scotland, such as policing by consent. One local authority body commented:

“We consider this to be not purely an operational matter, but a strategic and political matter requiring consultation and engagement at a national and local level” (Fife Council and Fife Partnership).

4.8 Some commented that this policy change without consultation came on the back of the move to the single force and other changes at local community level such as the closure of public counters, which contributed to a climate of decisions being taken remotely and without local community support.

Views on why there was no need for consultation

4.9 Ten respondents (two police bodies and eight members of the public) were clear that there was no need for consultation by Police Scotland on this issue.

The decision was viewed by them as operational and based on information to which others would not have been privy. However, one of these respondents perceived the issue of consultation to be delicate with matters of diplomacy also a consideration:

“This is a difficult question to answer. By rights the Firearms Act 1968 and College of Policing guidelines provide the Chief Constable with the ability to make this decision without consultation. We are wholly satisfied that it was an operational decision and therefore we would not expect to be consulted, nor would we expect consultation to be required per se.

That said, it was a major development for policing in Scotland and came into effect when the new force was in its early days. As such, in hindsight, it may have been better to brief the SPA and elected representatives more widely. By such means, factual accuracy would have also been in the debate and not erroneous information upon which most press and political comment has been based” (The Association of Scottish Police Superintendents).

Question 11: Would you expect Police Scotland to engage with the public and/or seek their views about deploying trained ARV police officers to routine incidents? Please outline the reason(s) for your answer, if possible.

4.10 145 respondents addressed this question (75% of all those responding to the consultation). Of these, 130 (90%) were clear that they expected Police Scotland to have engaged with the public and/or sought their views about deploying trained ARV police officers to routine incidents.

Reasons why respondents expected Police Scotland to have engaged with the public

4.11 By far the most common reason given by respondents for expecting Police Scotland to have engaged with the public on their decision was that they perceived the policy change to be one of much significance with implications going beyond operational issues. 59 respondents from a wide variety of sectors articulated this view. A typical comment was:

“This is a very major shift in the way Scotland is policed and has major implications for the relationship between the public and the police. It seems almost inconceivable that such a change has not involved a major public consultation” (Pub).

4.12 20 respondents (18 of them members of the public) argued that they would have expected the public to have been engaged with, in line policing by consent.

4.13 Respondents across four sectors considered that engaging with the public was a necessary part of maintaining good community relationships, would have

demonstrated respect for the public and could have served to educate the public on the decision (14 mentions).

4.14 13 respondents from five different sectors argued that such engagement is part of the overall scrutiny process and transparency which is required within a democracy. One local authority remarked:

“.....the policy itself is indisputably a strategic matter and as such it should not be excluded from the power of scrutiny awarded to local authorities in the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012. Even now that the decision has been reversed, Councils have not had sight of the policy in writing and it is not clear whether it even exists in written form” (Orkney Islands Council).

4.15 Seven respondents felt that as the policy was of considerable public interest, Police Scotland should have engaged with them over the decision.

4.16 Other rationales for expecting Police Scotland to have engaged with the public were:

- The decision is too big for the Chief Constable to make unilaterally. (5 mentions)
- A single police force makes it even more important to engage with people on the ground. (3 mentions)
- In order to make the correct decision. (Pub)

Views on engagement with other stakeholders

4.17 Many respondents identified other relevant parties whom they considered Police Scotland should have been engaged with in addition to/or instead of, the public. Those mentioned were:

- elected representatives
- COSLA and local authorities
- Parliament
- Community councils
- Community Planning Partnerships
- Justice agencies
- Scottish Government
- civic groups.

Views of those not expecting Police Scotland to engage with the public

4.18 There were several reasons stated by the 15 respondents who did not expect Police Scotland to engage with the public over the policy. A few respondents (including both police bodies) argued that the matter was an operational issue and therefore for Police Scotland to decide upon. The policy was viewed as one of national security by one member of the public who did not expect such security issues to be part of general public debate.

4.19 One respondent (Pub) argued that the policy operated elsewhere and was not a major issue of public concern. Another view (Pub) was that members of the public do not have the necessary expertise to inform that decision. The volume of media exposure was enough for one respondent (Pub) who felt this was sufficient engagement for the public.

4.20 Five respondents considered that others should have engaged with the public over the decision, rather than Police Scotland. The Scottish Government and SPA were identified in this respect.

Question 12: How can Police Scotland best address any public concerns and provide reassurance to individuals, groups or communities regarding its firearms deployment policy?

4.21 133 respondents addressed this question (69% of all those responding to the consultation). A few other respondents simply noted that they understood the policy had been changed since the consultation had been published. The most common response (52 mentions, 47 of whom were members of the public) was to recommend that the policy be reversed.

4.22 Overall 38 respondents called for Police Scotland to consult and/or engage with the public before implementing such significant policies as this. One local authority stated:

“Locally, there has been positive engagement and attempts to reassure the public about the policy. However, this has had to be a reactive approach. There should have been a full debate, these concerns considered and an assessment made on how best to address these prior to the introduction of the policy in the first place. Had this been done, then perhaps a different decision may have been taken.....the introduction of such a policy without full consultation raises concerns as to what other changes may be taken with regarding how policing is undertaken without consultation” (Highland Council).

4.23 Another prevalent theme (36 mentions) was that Police Scotland could address public concerns by being open and transparent about the reasons for implementing the policy, including providing underlying research evidence for its need. Comments included:

“...provide statistics from within the UK and similar Commonwealth Nations member states on routine incidents where firearms might have positively affected the outcome, or where their absence has led to public or police officer injury or death. Also use their research to back up Police Scotland's policy. Invite the Public to open seminars within their communities so they can interact with firearms trained officers and their superiors. Outline the level of training and degree of Pass they must reach. Demonstrate at these sessions how firearms are designed, their safety systems, how they are carried, serviced and

used, the circumstances under which firearms may be used by police officers and investigative procedures undertaken when firearms are used” (Pub).

“By explaining the issue in more detail and addressing the misconceptions that surround the matter. Poor communication is at the heart of this problem” (The Association of Scottish Police Superintendents).

“More work needs done by firearms training departments in each Police Scotland area, as they can set up, or video practical exercises which demonstrate the beneficial aspects of this policy. Local representatives could be invited to view these exercises, which could show historical operations where mistakes have been made due to previous policies” (Pub).

4.24 18 respondents recommended that in order to provide reassurance, the major policies of Police Scotland should be seen to have been subject to debate by elected members, Scottish Parliament, or local authority and community groups and organisations.

4.25 12 respondents remarked that the perception that Police Scotland is distant from local community needs is alarming to communities, and evidence that Police Scotland considers local contexts, and tailors its policies towards these, would go some way to addressing public concerns.

4.26 Seven respondents from four different sectors felt that it is not possible to provide reassurance, as the policy represents a vast shift from previous policy, has already been implemented, and confidence in Police Scotland has already been lost.

4.27 Two respondents felt that there was no need to provide any further reassurance as the policy is needed, and it is always likely to generate opposition, whatever further action is taken.

Question 13: What, if any, lessons can be learned from the implementation of Police Scotland’s firearms deployment policy about how operational policing decisions which may have wider strategic or community impact are consulted upon and communicated?

4.28 148 respondents addressed this question (76% of all those responding to the consultation).

4.22 By far the most common response (70 mentions) was that Police Scotland should learn that it should **consult with relevant stakeholders** (most highlighted the public in this regard) prior to implementing major policy change. This was

seen as a means to openness and transparency in decision-making and was in keeping with its status as a public body. A typical comment was:

“The only way in which policing can remain transparent and accountable is through public engagement and I am disappointed that on this occasion, and with such a significant policy, this did not happen. It must be a lesson learnt for the future” (an Elected Representative).

4.23 Other stakeholders over and above the public were identified as Community Planning Partnerships, the SPA, elected representatives, and the Justice Minister.

4.24 17 respondents considered that providing **information to the public in a timely fashion** (e.g. via local media) would have gone some way towards appeasing opposition and that this is a lesson which should be taken on board.

4.25 17 respondents recommended that Police Scotland become **more discerning about classifying a decision as solely operational** when it has wider community implications.

4.26 16 respondents highlighted a clear message that Police Scotland, despite its national profile, should still **maintain close liaison with local communities** via local networks, committees, local representatives and so on. It was felt that this would foster greater trust between local communities and Police Scotland. Some respondents urged that in future local context is taken more into consideration than was apparent in this instance. One local authority remarked:
“They should resist the temptation to go for an easy Scotland wide solution” (Dumfries and Galloway Council).

4.27 A few respondents recommended that despite being a national policy, **local scrutiny arrangements** should still apply where there is any potential local impact.

4.28 14 respondents suggested a lesson learned to be that major policies should always be **subject to robust scrutiny**. Six respondents called for parliamentary debate on issues of this gravitas. A member of the public stated
“.....the lesson is that something as radical and huge as this should be debated openly in parliament and among the people and not sneaked in without our notice.”

4.29 Nine respondents singled out **SPA for specific criticism recommending that this body should be more robust in overseeing decisions of Police Scotland**. Comments included:

“Scottish Police Authority should have questioned the Chief Constable over this decision rather than rubber stamped it. Justice Secretary should have insisted SPA did so. Chief Constable is accountable to

the SPA and the SPA should hold him to account. This would increase confidence in the way decisions are taken” (Elaine Murray, MSP for Dumfriesshire).

“The way in which Police Scotland's firearms deployment policy was implemented raises important questions about the governance arrangements for Police Scotland and, in particular, the relationship between Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Authority. It is not clear to what extent the SPA was aware of and had considered the change to the deployment policy. There is a need for more proactive communication on operational and strategic decisions by the Chief Constable and the SPA” (Fife Council and Fife Partnership).

4.30 11 respondents, including ten members of the public, identified a lesson learned to be that Police Scotland should **show that they respect the public and are prepared to listen to their opinions.**

4.31 Three respondents felt that Police Scotland should learn that they should **respond more quickly and admit it if they have made mistakes.**

Question 14: Any other comments on consultation and engagement?

4.32 A minority of respondents expressed additional substantive comments which they had not made previously. These fell into two categories: those referring to consultation on any significant policy change; and those referring to the current SPA consultation in particular.

Views on consultation on significant policy change

4.33 A recurring view was that in future, consultation should precede major policy change and not come after it. One member of the public described the current consultation as launched “after the horse has bolted”. Calls were made for future consultations to reach all sectors of society and be meaningful.

4.34 A few respondents, including three community councils urged that the structure of formal consultation mechanisms between the police and local stakeholders be reviewed in order to make these robust and effective. One member of the public recommended the establishment of police liaison boards in the northern Highlands with representatives from local government, police, civic groups and the public. Another respondent (CC) urged that the role of community police officers should not be overlooked. It was remarked that new liaison mechanisms are needed in view of the new single force structure. Another community council commented:

“It seems that since the amalgamation of the police forces has taken place that a one style fits all mentality has taken over. Communities throughout Scotland are different and as such may require different

procedures as suited to their particular situations” (Stockbridge and Inverleith Community Council).

4.35 The theme of greater local voice in national policy-making, particularly where there is significant community impact, was taken up by others. For example:

“It is vital that elected members’ stake in scrutinising Police Scotland’s national policy and the local implications of operational changes is recognised, as is their broader representative role for their local communities. This requires a robust scrutiny and governance arrangement, clarity over roles and responsibilities and a meaningful dialogue at a national level in addition to the local structures in place. COSLA will continue to monitor Police Scotland’s engagement with local authorities and seek evidence of improved consideration of local priorities in national police strategy” (COSLA).

4.36 One member of the public considered the make-up of the SPA Board, and suggested that this be more representative of every local authority in Scotland, in addition to there being sub-area Boards. Another provided their view that engagement had been better prior to the single force being established, in that the public previously had access to members of police committees and the Chief Constable sometimes was a member of the local community.

4.37 Several respondents were not confident that the same situation would not happen again, with major policies with local impact being implemented without what they regarded as adequate consultation. Some referred to previous occasions where they felt this had already happened, such as the closure of local police stations. Two respondents (CJA, ER) commented that the change of policy mid-way through the current consultation could be perceived as signalling yet another decision being taken without findings from consultation being taken into account. One local authority praised the SPA for carrying on with their consultation regardless of the more recent change in policy.


5. GENERAL VIEWS ON ARMED POLICING

Question 15: Assuming it is necessary for some trained police officers to have immediate access to firearms and be available across Scotland, on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being very reassured and 5 not at all reassured) please rate the following options:

a) A limited number of trained ARV police officers carrying visible firearms and attending routine incidents in support of local police officers or local priorities.

5.1 145 respondents (75% of all respondents) provided a rating in response to this question. Figure 5.1 below displays the ratings provided.

Figure 5.1: Views on level of reassurance relating to ARV police officers carrying visible firearms and attending routine incidents




5.2 In total, 119 respondents (82% of those who provided a rating) indicated that they were not at all reassured by this option. Nine respondents (6%) reported being very reassured. Amongst these nine respondents were six members of the public, the two police bodies and one MSP.

5.3 The average rating score was 4.6.

b) A limited number of trained ARV police officers carrying firearms covertly and attending routine incidents in support of local police officers or local priorities.

5.4 149 respondents (77% of all respondents) provided a rating in response to this question. Figure 5.2 overleaf displays the ratings provided.

Figure 5.2: Views on level of reassurance relating to ARV police officers carrying firearms covertly and attending routine incidents




5.5 In total, 81 respondents (54% of those who provided a rating) indicated that they were not at all reassured by this option. 15 respondents (10%) reported being very reassured. Amongst these 15 respondents were nine members of the public, two community councils, a police body, one local authority one MSP and one elected representative.

5.6 The average rating score was 4.0.

c) A limited number of trained ARV police officers carrying visible firearms but only being deployed to incidents where firearms are necessary or when the public or police officers are at imminent risk.

5.7 148 respondents (76% of all respondents) provided a rating in response to this question. Figure 5.3 displays the ratings provided.

Figure 5.3: Views on level of reassurance relating to ARV police officers carrying firearms covertly and attending routine incidents



5.8 In total, 83 respondents (56% of those who provided a rating) indicated that they were very reassured by this option, making this the option providing the most reassurance of the three presented. 17 respondents (11%) reported being not at all reassured. Amongst them were 14 members of the public, one police body, one elected representative and one MSP.

5.9 The average rating score was 2.1.

Question 16: Option c) above would mean that trained ARV police officers would not attend routine incidents in support of local police officers or local priorities. Does this restriction on their productivity or wider contribution to local policing give you any cause for concern? Please outline the reason(s) for your answer, if possible.

5.10 133 respondents provided some form of response to this question (69% of all respondents). Their responses were a mix of re-iteration of previous points made, concerns over the wording and intent of the question, some substantive comments but also a few queries.

5.11 The most prevalent theme to emerge from responses was that in addition to options a), b) and c), a further approach should be for trained ARV police officers to attend routine incidents but without carrying firearms (for example, leaving them locked securely in their vehicles). Respondents across a wide range of sectors put forward this view, stating that this is what they understood to have happened prior to recent changes in policing. Typical comments included:

“I have no problem with these officers attending local incidents and assisting: so long as they leave their guns in the station. Then productivity is not decreased, and a wider contribution is possible. Just because they are trained to carry a gun doesn't mean they can't operate without one surely?” (Pub).

“I am aware of what the situation was prior to the creation of the single force and see no reason, or none has been made public at any rate, why this needed to change. Why can their firearms not be kept securely in the firearms safe in their vehicles?” (Pub).

“My understanding is that prior to 2009 armed response was vehicle based and that officers could attend routine incidents but did not actually carry guns outwith the vehicle” (Dundee Council Police and Fire and Rescue Committee).

5.12 Many respondents stated that they did not have any concerns about option c) as they envisaged ARV police officers attending routine incidents but without their firearms. Three respondents indicated they were not concerned about option c) as these officers could be deployed doing backroom duties and keeping up with their firearms training when not out attending to incidents.

5.13 13 respondents stated clearly that they had concerns about option c) with regards to the potential impact on productivity or wider contribution to local policing. Six members of the public expressed concern over what they perceived to be a waste of highly trained police resources which would result from this option, with three of them considering this to be untenable in view of the current restricted police manpower.

5.14 A few concerns were raised that this arrangement may result in de-skilling police who will not maintain their daily contact with routine issues. One police body added that option c) may result in a lack of enthusiasm for ARV police officer posting. One respondent (Pub) predicted that they would be concerned if ARV police officers were the nearest to them if they required police intervention to what appeared to be a routine incident, but these officers were not deployed on account of being armed; another respondent (Pol) queried whether an incident could be defined as “routine” with many incidents having the potential to escalate quickly into becoming more serious.

5.15 Several respondents perceived questions 15 and 16 to contain obscure wording such as “productivity” and a level of vagueness of terms such as “where firearms are necessary”. They were not clear about the precise nature of the work which trained ARV police officers would be doing if they were not deployed to routine incidents, and did not have information on the assumed added productivity which ARV police officers would provide if attending routine incidents. Without greater clarity on such issues, some respondents felt ill-equipped to provide any informed view. For example, one local authority remarked:

“No evidence has been offered to suggest that having armed officers attending routine incidents has any beneficial effect on productivity, either in terms of armed response incidents or routine policing. Without that information it is not possible to provide any reasoned answer to this question” (Inverclyde Council).

5.16 One member of the public highlighted what they perceived to be an omission in the options under this section in that they referred only to routine incidents, and did not consider police officers being simply on patrol and not attending any particular incident, routine or otherwise.

6. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

6.1 Respondents were invited to submit any further comments over and above those already provided in response to the previous specific questions. 33 respondents submitted further substantive comments over and above those already documented and analysed previously.

6.2 One main theme emerged regarding accountability and scrutiny following the reform of the police service. Many respondents felt that since the operation of the single force, lines of accountability and scrutiny were not entirely clear. Calls were made for the scrutiny role of the SPA and of local authorities to be clarified, in addition to the defining clearly the scope of the Chief Constable for making major decisions affecting local policing. It was remarked that this policy change regarding armed police officers attending routine incidents followed on from a series of significant decisions affecting the public, such as stop and search, and the loss of local counter services. Concerns were raised that further controversial decisions may be taken without transparency over scrutiny of their underpinning and rationale.

6.3 Other comments were made by one or only a few respondents:

- We need to accept that times have changed and if intelligence suggests that it is necessary to arm police at routine incidents, then we have to accept this. (5 mentions)
- It would be helpful to have access to the evidence which justifies this policy. Without being given this the policy appears to the public as trying to mend something that is not broken. (5 mentions)
- Opposition to the policy has been fuelled largely by insensitivities about openly displaying firearms whilst on routine duties, and also the way the policy has been implemented. These, rather than the policy itself, are the main issues of concern for some. (4 mentions)
- There should be more of a focus on non-lethal weapons like CS or pepper spray for front-line officers. (1 mention)
- The policy was introduced in order to meet tight budgets and has nothing to do with making the public safer. (1 mention)

ANNEX 1: LIST OF RESPONDENTS

Local Authorities

Dumfries and Galloway Council
Dundee Council Police and Fire and Rescue Committee
East Renfrewshire Council
Fife Council and Fife Partnership
Glasgow City Council
Highland Council
Inverclyde Council
North Lanarkshire Council
Orkney Islands Council
Renfrewshire Council
South Ayrshire Council
South Lanarkshire Safer South Lanarkshire Board
Stirling Council Public Safety Committee
West Lothian Council
Western Isles Council Environment and Protective Services Committee

Elected representatives

Convenor Community Safety Perth and Kinross Council
Councillor for Argyle and Bute Council
Councillor for East Lothian Council
Councillors for Highland Council (three councillors)
Councillor for Perth and Kinross Council
Councillor for Renfrew North Council
One unnamed elected representative

Community Councils

Auchterhouse Community Council
City of Brechin and District Community Council
Liberton and District Community Council
Montrose Community Council
Stockbridge and Inverleith Community Council
Strathmartine Community Council

Police bodies

Scottish Police Federation
The Association of Scottish Police Superintendents

Community Justice Authorities

North Strathclyde Community Justice Authority
South West Scotland Community Justice Authority

Community Safety Partnerships

Midlothian Community Safety Partnership

Moray Community Safety Partnership

MSPs

Alison McInnes, Member for North East Scotland Region & Scottish Liberal Democrat Justice Spokesperson

Elaine Murray, Member for Dumfriesshire

Other

Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA)

Craigie High School Dundee

Fellowship of Reconciliation – Scotland

Inclusion Scotland

Scottish Episcopal Church

Scottish Human Rights Commission

Victim Support Scotland

Individuals

149 respondents